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By Blake A. Riordan and Monte K. Hurst=
=
Earlier
this week, a divided U.S. Supreme Court issued an employer-friendly
opinion, ruling that employees cannot sue their employers for unequal p=
ay
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”=
;)
because of discrimination that may have occurred years earlier. In Ledbetter v. Goodyear Ti=
re and
Rubber Co., the Supreme Court sent a clear message to employers and
potential plaintiffs that if a plaintiff fails to timely file a charge =
of
discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (the
“EEOC”) following an alleged
discriminatory pay practice, any claim under Title VII based on that pr=
actice
will be time-barred, regardless of the subsequent adverse effects the
practice may have on the plaintiff’s pay.
=
Under
Title VII, an individual wishing to challenge an employment practice mu=
st
first file a charge of discrimination with the EEO=
C. Such a charge must be filed wi=
thin a
specified period (either 180 or 300 days, depending on the state) after=
the
alleged unlawful employment practice has occurred. If the individual does not sub=
mit a
timely EEOC charge, he/she cannot challenge=
the
practice in court. <=
/o:p>
=
=
In this
significant case, Lilly Ledbetter (“Ledbetter”) worked for
Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company (“Goodyear”) from 1979 unt=
il
1998. As a salaried emplo=
yee,
Ledbetter was given or denied raises based on her supervisors’
evaluations of her performance.
=
=
In March
1998, Ledbetter submitted a questionnaire to the E=
EOC
alleging certain acts of gender discrimination, including unequal pay.<=
span
style=3D'mso-spacerun:yes'> In July 1998, she filed a form=
al EEOC charge containing similar allegations. After taking early retirement =
in
November 1998, Ledbetter filed a lawsuit in federal district court, in
which she asserted, among other things, a claim for pay discrimination
under Title VII.
=
=
The
district court granted summary judgment in favor of Goodyear on several=
of
Ledbetter’s claims, but allowed her Title VII pay discrimination
claim to proceed to trial. At
trial, Ledbetter supported her Title VII claim by introducing evidence =
that
during the course of her employment (which spanned nearly 20 years),
several supervisors had given her poor evaluations because of her gende=
r,
that as a result of these evaluations her pay was not increased as much=
as
it would have been if she had been evaluated fairly, and that these pay
decisions continued to affect the amount of her pay throughout her
employment. Toward the en=
d of
Ledbetter’s employment, Goodyear was paying her significantly less
than any of her male colleagues.
Although Goodyear contended at trial that the evaluations had be=
en
nondiscriminatory, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Ledbetter and
awarded her back pay and significant damages.
=
=
On
appeal, Goodyear argued that Ledbetter could not assert a pay
discrimination claim based on pay decisions made prior to September 26,
1997, which was exactly 180 days before the date on which she filed her=
EEOC questionnaire. Establishing this cutoff date,
Goodyear argued that no discriminatory act relating to Ledbetter’s
pay occurred after September 26, 2997.=
The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed the distr=
ict
court’s judgment based on the jury’s verdict and held that
Ledbetter’s Title VII pay discrimination claim could not be based=
on
any pay decision that occurred before the last pay decision that affect=
ed
her pay during the EEOC charging period (the
180-day period preceding the filing of her EEOC
questionnaire). The court=
of
appeals concluded that there was insufficient evidence to establish that
Goodyear acted with discriminatory intent in deciding to deny Ledbetter
raises in 1997 and 1998, which were the only two pay decisions that took
place within the 180-day charging period.
=
=
The
Supreme Court majority of five justices affirmed the court of
appeals’ decision and held that the later effects of past
discrimination do not restart the clock for filing an EEOC
charge and, therefore, Ledbetter’s claim was untimely. Ledbetter argued that the payc=
hecks
she received during the charging period and the 1998 raise denial each
violated Title VII and triggered a new EEOC
charging period. However,=
the
Supreme Court disagreed and found that allowing Ledbetter to prevail on
such a theory would require the Court in effect to “jettison̶=
1;
the discriminatory intent element of her disparate treatment claim.
=
=
The
Supreme Court also found its precedent clearly instructs that the EEOC charging period is triggered when a discrete
unlawful practice occurs.
Indeed, a new violation does not occur, and a new charging period
does not commence, upon the occurrence of subsequent nondiscriminatory =
acts
that involve adverse effects resulting from the past discrimination. However, if an employer engage=
s in a
series of separately actionable intentionally discriminatory acts, then=
a
new violation takes place when each new act is committed.
=
=
Ledbetter
failed to allege that any discriminatory conduct occurred during the
charging period. She also
failed to allege that Goodyear neglected to communicate to her any
discriminatory decisions occurring before the charging period, which may
have prompted the Court to explore whether the limitations period was t=
olled
until she learned of the discriminatory decisions. Rather, Ledbetter solely argue=
d that
Goodyear’s nondiscriminatory conduct during the charging period g=
ave
present effect to the discriminatory conduct occurring well before the
charging period, namely, the poor performance evaluations she received
earlier in her career.
According to the Supreme Court, finding liability on the part of
Goodyear in this situation would unjustly allow current effects to
“breathe life into prior, uncharged discrimination.”
=
=
To
maintain a viable claim, Ledbetter should have filed an EEOC
charge within 180 days after learning of each discriminatory pay
decision. Shifting forwar=
d the
intent associated with her earlier performance evaluations to the 1998
raise denial would improperly shift the requisite intent away from the =
act
that consummated the discriminatory employment practice to a subsequent=
act
performed without any bias or discriminatory motive. This would unjustly impose lia=
bility
on Goodyear in the absence of the requisite intent.
=
=
Allowing
Ledbetter to proceed with her claim under these circumstances would also
run contrary to Title VII’s
“integrated, multistep, enforcement
procedure.” The sho=
rt EEOC filing deadline reflects Congress’ int=
ent to
encourage prompt resolution of employment discrimination claims through
voluntary conciliation and cooperation. The brief filing deadline also
protects employers from being forced to defend stale claims of
discrimination made several years after the circumstantial evidence typ=
ically
associated with such claims has disappeared.
=
=
The Ledbetter
decision will significantly affect pay discrimination claims brought un=
der
Title VII. Although the
decision is strictly limited to Title VII pay discrimination claims, it=
is
not restricted to pay discrimination claims brought by women. Indeed, Ledbetter will =
apply
to all pay discrimination claims brought pursuant to Title VII by anyone
belonging to a protected class.
Notably, the Supreme Court indicated that the framework for
analyzing pay discrimination claims brought under the Equal Pay Act of
1963, the Fair Labor Standards Act, and the National Labor Relations Act
should remain unchanged.
=
=
Further,
this decision will make it extremely difficult for plaintiffs to prove a
claim of pay discrimination which occurs over a period of several years,
unless they are able to discover pay disparities consistently and avail
themselves of the EEOC’s remedies
immediately. Pay disparit=
ies
often occur, as they did in Ledbetter’s case, in small increments,
and cause to suspect that a discriminatory practice has occurred may on=
ly
develop slowly over time. More
importantly, employers usually keep comparative pay information
confidential, thus preventing an employee receiving unequal pay from ev=
er
suspecting that he/she is entitled to judicial intervention.=
=
=
Unless,
or until, Congress answers Justice Ginsburg’s plea in her dissent=
ing
opinion calling for legislation that will effectively overturn the
majority’s opinion, employers will enjoy a brief period of
fortification from plaintiffs’ claims of pay discrimination under
Title VII based solely on the effects of discriminatory decisions made
years earlier. However,
employers will by no means be immune from pay discrimination claims. Indeed, plaintiffs still have =
other
federal and state statutes at their disposal to redress their pay
discrimination grievances.
If you have any questions or comments regarding this decis=
ion,
please contact the Hermes Sargent Bates attorney with whom you work. Le=
arn
more about our Employment & Labor Practice.
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